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Attention to the meaning and making of citizenship rights-has been largely 
absent from the intellectual agenda for too long. Thirty years have passed since 
Reinhardt Bendix's Nation-Building and Citizenship, and over forty since T.H. 
Marshall first published his masterful series of lectures, Citizenship and Social 
Class. 1 Happily we can now celebrate the forthcoming republication in a new 
edition of T.H. Marshall's classic (with a lengthy introduction by Tom Bottomore). 
This could hardly be more timely. Rarely have the politics of citizenship, rights, 
and social change more dramatically been yoked together than in recent years 
where societies constructed on a framework of state control, such as in Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union, and China, have collapsed or been fundamentally 
challenged by the mobilizing force of an extraordinary source of power--popular 
claims to citizenship rights. What is most notable about these rights-claims is 
their political specificity: citizenship rights may appear 'natural,' but they are 
rights-claims justified by membership in a historically constructed political 
community. As such, they have unfurled in the context of national public spheres 
and state power. The world-historical impact of these events is obvious. The 
implications for politics and sociology should also be both large and urgent: Just 
what is this power we call citizenship and how and why is such an identity 
constructed as a dynamic force in history? 
The exigency of this question makes it especially unfortunate that recent 
sociological discussion of citizenship has been so scant. Among Western 
intellectuals the reasons for this silence are not hard to identify. The persistence 
(currently the increase) of social inequalities in the face of celebrated liberal 
freedoms seems only to highlight the shallowness of that which we most commonly 
associate with citizenship--formal civil rights and a limited concern for individual 
liberty. The language of citizenship is further made suspect by its association with 
liberalism's apparent focus on individual rather than social rights. I t  is thus not 
surprising that scholarship has concentrated on the politics of class, and the 
historical formation of working-class movements for social and economic change 
have dominated discussion and inquiry. 
But there is a sociological message in the political charge recently ignited 
around the world: People are empowered by an identity-politics; social change is 
made by people whose sense of who they rn is violated fundamentally; and it 
increasingly appears that the identity of self as a 'rights-bearing' person is perhaps 
the most inviolable, and the most empowering. And there are other elements of 
this message. ,Despite the similarities across European movements, for example, 
the recent mobilizations have nonetheless unfolded in the context of local political 
cultures, that which the activists call 'civil society.' These are people who have 
articulated their rights-claims to be held by virtue of political membership in a 
sphere that is neither of the individual nor of the state. 
The implications of this seem striking: We need to reproblematize the 
politics of citizenship; citizenship is a 'contested truth'--its meaning politically and 
historically constructed. We need to explore why the context of participation is in 
the pluralities of local civil society rather than in either the individual or the state. 
Above all we need to look at  the ways that political issues of participatory and 
civil rights have been integral to--rather than exclusive of--those of economic 
justice. It is crucial to understand how both class and politics mutually influence 
the formation of rights. 
T.H. Marshall wrote in a very different time than ours. Britain in 1950 
was in its glory days of expanding institutions of social citizenship--from health 
care to education. Those days seem a long way from our current political 
economies. Yet Marshall's discussions of the relationship between social class 
inequalities and the formal status equality of citizenship is even more germane 
today. It is for this reason that a reconsideration of his work seems fitting. This 
essay will explore Marshall's work on the same ground as he did--the formation, 
course, and consequences of citizenship in English history. There are three parts 
to my essay. In the first, I will lay out those aspects of Marshall's argument with 
which I am most concerned and I will formulate in relatively theoretical terms five 
specific "points of contention." In the second section, I will offer a rather general 
"counter-narrative" of English citizenship-formation to that of Marshall's. Out of 
that counter-narrative will emerge my amended conception of citizenship. And 
finally in the third section, I will present a more closely grounded example of the 
making and meaning of citizenship in one type of local political culture--English 
towns and municipalities. 
What this paper is definitely not is a paper about the rise of capitalism, or 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism, or even the actual historical impact of 
capitalism on legal rights. It is not even directly concerned with the qualitative 
impact of citizenship institutions on social inequalities. Nor is it a paper taking a 
position on the 'urbanist' theory of the development of capitalism; and most 
especially it is not a celebration of a 'golden-age.' What it does address are the 
institutional roots of a political culture--roots which have perhaps been too long 
obscured by debate over-the normative implications and the contested uses of 
English history. 
I -
T.H. Marshall and  citizens hi^: Point Counter-Point 
T.H. Marshall's classic Citizenship and Social Class is an explanation for the 
successive growth of citizenship rights in the context of the development, course 
and consequences of the capitalist mode of production. Marshall's path breaking 
achievement was to expand and redefine citizenship away from a narrow legal 
concept of formal individual liberty or even democratic participation. Instead he 
presented a conception embracing not only these rights but also the right to be 
provided with antidotes to social inequalities through economic welfare and a 
modicum of social justice. His three-dimensional definition includes civil, political 
and social rights.2 Civil rights are those we associate with formal individual 
liberties--habeas corpus, the right of association, the right to sell one's labour on a 
free market, and the right to justice--the courts of law without which no right 
would be politically meaningful. Political liberties are participatory rights--the 
right to vote, to elect representatives, and so on. Social rights are what he calls 
the "consumer" rights of the modern welfare state. This bundle of rights attaches 
to persons through what Marshall calls the "status" of citizenship. 
It is the relationship between the rights endowed by citizenship status 
premised on equality one the one side, and the fundamental inequality of the 
social class structure on the other that most interests Marshall. The two sides 
represent, in his words, "warring principlesw--those of status equality and right 
against contract inequality and markets. Developing a theory to account for the 
cause and consequences of these warring tensions in modern society forms the 
heart of his work: 
In Marshall's explanation the engine of modern citizenship is in the social 
forces and conflicts of capitalism. The needs of capitalist society for free 
individuals available for labour markets and bourgeois needs for mobile property 
get the motor going and lead to the achievement of civil rights. Once set in 
motion, the subsequent contradictions between capitalist social forces and the 
exclusions and inequalities of the class system keep the drive going. Eventually 
all three citizenship rights are sequentially instituted through socio-economic 
change and class formation. This initial premise leads his historical periodization 
to coincide with epochs of class formation. 
In the first stage of the long eighteenth-century the triumph of the gentry in 
the Glorious Revolution ushered in civil citizenship; political citizenship was a 
product of the nineteenth-century ascendancy of the middle class; while social 
citizenship came in the twentieth century with-.the power of the. working .class and 
the institutionalization of the welfare state. For Marshall each phase of 
citizenship is not organically contained in the preceding one. He allows for 
separate developmental stories for each component. He also dismisses a teleology 
of rights which derive ultimately from individual property rights. But although 
they are not logically derived in this way, he nonetheless insists that the 
emergence proceeded in necessary stages, each right a product of the 
developmental logic of capitalism and its processes of class formation. 
The meaning of the growth of citizenship is fundamentally Marshall's story 
of the enlargement of individual rights to autonomy and equality. To be sure, 
each individual legally is given an equal opportunity to citizenship rights as a 
consequence of her social status as citizen; but it is the individual who inhabits 
this status and thus is endowed with the rights the status accords. 
Marshall's definition of citizenship as embracing three spheres has yet to be 
surpassed. The strength of his classifications is their insight into the political 
nature of social life and the recognition that social as well as political rights can 
t. only stem from a political community. Moreover, his emphasis on the 
institutionalization of rights as a necessary component of their realization is a 
i major contribution. But his greatest contribution perhaps is in his originality and 
clarity in posing what has now become a common problematic among political 
sociologists--the inherent tension between capitalism and democracy or, in his 
formulation--between market inequality and the principle of equality. Marshall's 
intellectual inheritance (Tawney, et.al) and his own moral impulses make 
immediate the unexpected consequences of the unification within a single society 
of the contrary tendencies toward the inequalities consequent to legal freedoms in 
law and markets on the one hand, and those toward the equalizing goals of social 
welfare and democratic education on the other.3(?)(?)(?) 
,F 1 v e Points of Contention: 
There are, nonetheless, serious problems with Marshall's account of the 
growth of citizenship, its relationship to capitalist development, and the meaning 
he ascribes to citizenship. To be sure, his primary interest was less with the rise 
of citizenship that with building a theory that could make sense of its paradoxical 
consequences for twentieth-century social and economic relations. But Marshall's 
theory of contemporary society is not structurally static; its powerful analysis of 
the tensions between citizenship and society, as well among the different 
dimensions of rights is entirely dep-endent on the historicity of their emergence. 
Indeed all explanations are part theory and part historicity--or dynamic historical 
narratives4 To fully consider his theory, there is no choice but to seriously 
address its historical foundations. 
I start by embracing Marshall's three-dimensional definition of citizenship. 
But I will take issue with five of his explanatory themes--the structural dynamic, 
the historical agency, the timing, the spatial distribution, and the meaning of 
citizenship. In preview: 1) Where Marshall sees the structural motor of capitalist 
social forces a t  work in the development of citizenship, I see a shifting 
configuration of political and community institutions and a concomitant political 
culture of rights; 2) Where Marshall sees the agents of citizenship to be social 
classes, I see members of contesting institutions as the protagonists in the drama 
of rights; 3) Where Marshall sees citizenship rights sequentially follow the 
transition from traditional feudal to modern capitalist society, I see the 
institutional roots of citizenship long before capitalism and a subsequent 
contingency in the enlargement and contraction of rights unattached to any macro- 
processes of feudalism's demise, capitalism's rise, or societal modernization in 
general; 4) Where Marshall sees a national uniform extension of rights, I see both 
a localized and uneven spatial distribution as well as an uneven capacity for and 
consequences of exercising those rights--indeed permanently variable and contested 
degrees of autonomy and equality; 5) And where Marshall sees citizenship as the 
gradual enlargement of individual rights to wider spheres of society through the 
equality of status, I see citizenship rights as a hybrid that a t  once embodies 
institutional membership and social attachments, as well as the capacity for the 
individual exercising of those rights. 
Structural dvnamic Marshall's analysis of political developments is firmly 
anchored in the social structures of feudalism and capitalism. The motor of his 
sequential process of citizenship-formation is in the needs and inevitable social 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. Citizenship rights as we know 
them were non-existent before capitalism. Any initial impulses towards or even 
early expressions of rights were thoroughly impeded by the unequal status 
structure of feudal society. Only the equality of status necessary to and promoted 
by capitalism enabled their initial "take-off." The expansion of citizenship was in 
turn driven by capitalism's ensuing conflicting principles--legal equality and social 
inequality. Marshall's theory takes a curious twist; rather than status to contract, 
he move from status to contract d status. 
The fundamental point that distinguishes myself- from Marshall's is that in 
my argument the processes of citizenship-formation are not anchored in social 
structures--whether feudal or capitalist--and exist in analytic (although of course 
not historical) autonomy from the categories of status and class. Rather than in 
the transition to capitalism, I see the roots of citizenship not in the 'birth of class 
society' but in the legal revolution of medieval England and the formation of a 
national public sphere and a concomitant political culture of rights. The 
institutional patterns of England's public sphere--by which I mean the conjoining 
of a territorial-wide public law with the public urban and rural communities of the 
realm--was unique. (I use the term to avoid the confusion associated with either 
the term the "statew--which is too reified and too diffficult to distinguish from "the 
government" or "the crown," or the "nation-state1'--which is too anachronistic and 
carries too many connotations.) Alone among processes of Western state- 
formation, only the English crown created a national public sphere by 
appropriating from below and extending throughout the land the political and 
legal conventions of the medieval cities (the city 'writ-large') and (to a lesser 
extent) those of the public villages. As a result, remedies of procedural justice 
(civil citizenship) ensuring personal liberty coexisted with both national regulatory 
and redistributive statutes (social citizenship) and legal institutions which 
commanded community participation (political citizenship) in the administration of 
law.5 
By appropriating and extending throughout the land the political culture of 
the city, English state-building institutionalized a working definition of liberty and 
rights linked to public law, local participation and, above all, the rights of public 
membership. Beginning in the seventeenth century, these ideas had to compete 
with a newly developed idea of liberty based solely on the individual rights and 
property produced from autonomous labour. These Lockean ideas of natural rights 
have dominated the social history of working class politics. But- not only did the 
former public conception of rights and freedom prove remarkably robust in its 
competition with Locke's ideas; arguably, it was more sigmfkant in shaping 
modern popular conceptions of and claims to citizenship. 
While the struggles over rights were deeply embroiled with the inequalities-- 
indeed the violence--of capitalism, these struggles and their institutional 
concomitants were consistently mediated through constitutional and juridical 
channels. Indeed as an institutional force in the historical landscape, the culture 
of rights played a constitutive role.in shaping the patterns and timing and 
character of both feudal and capitalist relations as they changed and developed 
over the course of the centuries. The history of struggles over citizenship becomes 
less intelligible in the absence of a full picture of these institutional foundations. 
Agency: The agents in Marshall's account of citizenship are social classes 
whose structural positions and interests in effect thrust them into the historical 
arena. The dynamism behind these struggles, however, was less the class actors 
than the contradictory principles between the inequalities of class under capitalism 
and the formal equality of status under citizenship. 
In contrast the agents of my story are members of particular communities 
or institutions in different sectors of the public sphere. At different times and 
places, and for different reasons, these membership groups formed alliances or 
antagonisms with other groups. Some of the contending and coalescing groups 
included peasant families in pastoral regions of England, monarchical state- 
builders, baronial challengers to the crown, merchant middle-men engaged in the 
rural putting-out industry, small-fry constables engaged in enforcing the law in 
local villages, and the artisans and journeymen of guilds. Depending on 
circumstances and resources, rights were successfully institutionalized, realized, 
blocked, or neglected in the course these alliances and contestations. 
In these contestations, legal institutions and a culture of rights were both 
the resources and the outcomes of these alliances and antagonisms. It would be 
difficult if not impossible to know which came first in any causal sequence. 
Examples of some of the institutions and cultural resources involved included the 
legal right to remedy against the "overmighty," guaranteed trial by jury of one's 
neighborhood, the administration of justice and governance through local juridical 
bodies, the discourse of the universality of law, the doctrine of the "king's two 
bodies," and the existence of statutory regulations mandating that minimum and 
maximum wages were to be locally administered. 
The explicit reasons motivating particular alignments at particular times 
included economic reasons, as well as religious, familial, political, moral, military, 
and so on. Usually there was a combination of reasons. But regardless of the 
particularities of any given coalition or conflict, the issues were fought out over 
competing conceptions of membership rights. Because labour relations, for 
example, were embedded in legal policies (social citizenship), struggles over labour 
conditions became struggles over the appropriation of law and the realization of 
rights. 
Perhaps most importantly, -the:outcomes.of .these struggles were -less 
attached to their agency in class or status groups but in the character of the site of 
contestation. Only occasionally were the agents' intentions or interests translated 
into results; more commonly, the struggles over rights and their institutional 
expression led in directions wholly unanticipated. This was especially true in the 
surprising case of popular appropriation and transformation of the discourse and 
promises of universal justice. 
Temporalitv: Marshall's sequential timing of citizenship--from civil, to 
political, to social--is a direct outgrowth of his initial anchoring of the process in 
the capitalist social structure and its class agents. This initial premise leads his 
historical periodization to coincide with epochs of class formation--since each right 
is a product of the developmental conflicts of capitalism and its stages of class 
formation. I t  follows from this that Marshall's is an amended theory of 
modernization: citizenship can only be truly identified with the decline of 
traditional feudal society (status) and the rise of a modern capitalist one (contract). 
Although his amendment of modernity (contract plus status) is a major 
contribution, like all versions of modernization, a fundamental discontinuitv must 
be located in the transition between the two. This is why Marshall acknowledges 
the presence of "traditional" sorts of rights under feudalism but argues for a 
qualitative break before modern rights begin to emerge in the eighteenth century. 
I t  also forces him to limit the presence of political rights to the nineteenth century, 
and social rights to the twentieth. 
By contrast I see a contingent and uneven process to the institutionalization 
of citizenship rights which does not correspond to a periodization of the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism. Indeed virtually all the multiple and overlapping 
groups of English communities claimed, exercised, benefited and suffered from 
both the expansion and the contraction of all three types of citizenship rights long 
before the triumph of their "proper" structural cause. In certain settings all three 
dimensions of citizenship existed and were exercised in institutional and practical 
terms before anything resembling the capitalist mode of production arrived in the 
English countryside. At times one or more of these rights became faint through 
repeal or desuetude, while a t  other times they were central players in the 
historical drama. The most significant point of difference is that I begin the story 
with the medieval legal revolutions and insist that rather than a qualitative break 
from this period, modem citizenship rights can only be fully understood as 
continuations--albeit with major transformations--from these medieval foundations. 
Scope and scale, the problem of place; Marshall views modern citizenship 
rights as society-wide in scope since they are concomitants of holistic societal 
transformations. The scale of citizenship, the classes who carried them out, the 
breadth of' the economic changes, and ultimately the institutionalization of the 
rights themselves were universal rather than particular. In this he follows his 
disciplinary training in sociology with its nonsensical neglect to spatial distinctions 
and cultural differences within single societies. 
In contrast I see the paradox of England's national political culture of rights 
to be in the fact that it produced highly localized and multiple practices of rights 
and their enforcement. Even formally institutionalized rights were totally local in 
effect and were always transformed in the particular settings where they were 
implemented. This was a direct result of the peculiar nature of England's public 
sphere--the political entity which conferred these rights. Its hybrid conjoining into 
the structure of rule national, county, and local spheres of power created a central 
ratchet point of vulnerability--local governance. As a result, the meaning of rights 
varied radically depending on the setting and the administrative relationships 
where it was actually exercised. Not surprisingly the struggles for and over rights 
were also highly local and unevenly distributed over the social and geographical 
landscape. 
Meaning: For Marshall, the essence of a right is precisely in its 
attachment to an autonomous individual. Because the status of citizenship is by 
definition a social category, the rights it confers can only be carried by individuals 
abstracted from their actual relational settings.6 The conflicts Marshall identifies 
between individual freedoms and the distributive measures necessary for greater 
social equality do not affect this ontological premise of the rights-bearing 
individual. 
By contrast, the citizenship rights I see exercised in historical practice 
comprise a hybrid of more commonly perceived incompatibilities between 
individual and communitarian conceptions of rights, or negative and positive 
liberty. (Indeed so dichotomous is this false distinction that most communitarians 
do not even accept the concept of rights as ontologically consistent with their view 
of the self.7) My conception of a right entails recognizing that only the 
relationality of rights, (an outcome of what I will call 'autonomy in membership' 
and 'liberty in embeddedness') provides the means to exercise autonomy and 
independence3 Citizenship rights are indeed rights which support and allow a 
high degree of independence; a t  the same time they are predicated on the 
attachmentsrand.the'constraints of,membership within a particular group--from 
family, to village, to trade union, to party, to national public sphere. As will be 
evident in my discussion below, even the achievement of the civil right to liberty 
presupposes the achievement of an a priori right to membership and the necessary 
maintenance of attachments. Indeed the history of rights sadly reveals their 
diminishment with the attenuation of particular communities; while the 
attenuation of memberships also reveals the concomitant loss of individual 
empowerment and independence. 
Rather than a category of social status-the meaning of citizenship rights can 
be viewed as a bundle of enforceable claims which are variably appropriated by 
members of communities within a territorially defined nation-state. A right, like 
all forms of moral and legal power, does not come attached to anyone social group 
or institution; rather it is a free-floating cultural and institutional resource whose 
appropriation and consequence only has meaning in practical context. In this 
sense, legal discourse is one of the most powerful of rights; but who benefits from 
it will depend upon the distribution of power among those groups seeking to justify 
their claims according to that discourse. A right is thus a social practice; it is not 
a "thing." 
I11 
A Counter-Narrative of Citizenshir, 
These five points of contention are all elaborated in my alternative view of 
citizenship-formation. My story, in brief, is told through the making of the 
political culture of the public sphere in which citizenship-rights were developed and 
contested in medieval and early modern England. It the history of coalitions and 
contentions, alliances and antagonisms, that play out in a shifting configuration of 
institutional relationships and political cultures. The premise of my story is that 
development of citizenship becomes less intelligible when analytically or 
historically severed from these medieval institutional and cultural foundations. 
Rather than one of social forces making, controlling, and patterning political 
rights, it is a story of the institutional and cultural foundations of those rights and 
their overwhelming importance in shaping patterns of social relations as well as 
social and political conflicts. I do not suggest that social forces are not important; 
on the contrary, it is the interaction between these forces and the shifting 
institutional patterns of the public sphere that makes the history and the 
realization of citizenship and its rights so unpredictable. 
My counter-narrative begins with a set of questions and observations. For 
Marshall, the three dimensions of citizenship were historically sequential; they 
may not have been logically derivative but their successive phasing was 
historically necessary and followed a developmental modernizing continuum. But 
if his schema makes sense, how are we to account in the early nineteenth century 
for the loss of long-standing social citizenship rights such as apprenticeship 
regulations?9 And why the decrease in political citizenship in the after a period of 
democratic expansion in the seventeenth?lO Why did England have 500 years of 
poor laws which were first radically reformed in 1832? And why were finimum 
wage regulations first passed in 1604--three centuries before Marshall's social 
citizenship--only to be repealed in 1814?11 
The same sorts of questions of periodization are applicable in reflecting upon 
the agency of citizenship-formation. In the context of Marshall's account of 
periodization one of the most perplexing questions arises in light of the continuity 
of political practices before and after the transition from "traditional society" and 
"feudalism," to "modernity" and "capitalism. Noticing the disproportionate 
presence of collective actions in the rural-industrial regions of seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century England, scholars have been quick to argue that the key to 
understanding the content and meaning of these struggles is the onset of early 
capitalist labour relations.12 But a glance backwards to the same communities in 
the same settings reveals substantively similar conceptions of and claims to rights- 
-attached to different specific problems of course. The long-term evidence is 
striking: From as early as the fourteenth century peasant and later rural- 
industrial communities from the pastoral regions of England claimed rights and 
expectations towards the law in language and in actions remarkably similar to 
those of their nineteenth-century progeny discussed above. 13 These early 
labouring families also linked the independence and cohesion of their communities 
to the participatory rights and distributive ideals of English citizenship. Moreover, 
they appeared to carry these citizenship expectations with them directly into the 
modern nineteenth-century world of industrialization. 
These practices, moreover, were highly local and regionally-specific. No less 
striking than the temporal continuity is the evidence of persistent spatial and 
geographical distinctions in rights-claims and attitudes toward the law. 14 Also 
dating from the fourteenth century, communities specifically from pastoral, later 
rural-industrial, and eventually industrial villages demonstrated explicitly positive 
claims and expectations of citizenship-rights. There is less evidence for any such 
positive expectations or practices towards the law in those communities comprised 
primarily of large commercial agricultural labour. 15 
The contrast is notable: Rural-industrial communities appear almost "guild- 
like" in their political cultures,l6 while their labouring agrarian, but same-class, 
neighbors revealed a radically different, and negative, attitude towards the law. 
Far from "rights", these latter communities clearly perceived the institutions of 
law and justice to be oppressive. 
Any theory of the historical development of rights-claims would have to be 
able to account for these surprising problems of time and place. These-are the 
sorts of questions that organize my counter-narrative. 
The Mak ing of t he Publ' ic S ~ h e r e  
To understand the meaning of citizenship we must begin by exploring the 
context of its making. The meaning of English citizenship is revealed in the 
historicity of the public sphere that first conferred and demanded it. The first 
national entity in England to confer citizenship rights was what I am calling the 
medieval public sphere. The history of the formation of a national public sphere 
must begin in eleventh and twelfth-century England before the presence of a 
unified territorial-wide state. Decentralization was the hallmark of this period of 
so-called feudalism, and it is generally characterized as comprised of a single 
political culture of "parcellized sovereignties" of mighty fiefdoms with the crown 
simply one among many feudal landlords. 
By contrast, I will map the landscape roughly into four different political 
and legal cultures. The first is the most familiar: The rich arable regions of 
England dominated by significant manors and their lords, and administered 
through manor courts (hall moots). These private spheres of power (which varied 
tremendously in size and resources) most closely fit the stereotype of the feudal 
social order--a hierarchical chain of relationships connecting lords, vassals, and a 
large population of servile unfree peasant labourers (villeins). In this system of 
vertical ties, each link plays a part in the story of citizenship-formation. The 
strongest manorial lords formed the core of the legendary baronial competition to 
the crown (leading to the Magna Carta) which served as a catalyst as well as a 
response to ongoing monarchical state-building ambitions. Curiously, it was the 
relationship of the vassals to their lords which were most significant for our story. 
Although subordinated in a chain of command to their lord, they nonetheless had 
laid claim to significant rights which gave them--unlike the villeins--a great deal of 
autonomy. Institutionalized through the manor courts, these rights-in-relationality 
come to play an exemplary role in the development of citizenship. Finally, as they 
transform over time into agrarian landless labourers, these unfree peasant 
communities will serve as an unhappy example of the contested meaning of 
citizenship. The political culture of rights is, in their case, appropriated not by 
them but against them, an outcome which both testifies and contributes to the 
crucial role of local political cultures and relationships. 
The second sphere is the least familiar: Vast areas of relatively non-arable 
land--called the champion (champagnd regions--populated primarily by small free- 
holding peasant communities who farmed and lived in small scattered villages. 
Unlike our image of feudal society these champion or pastoral regions had few 
great manors and more often than not there were was no resident dominating 
manor. Governance took place through local public courts--some ancient county 
and "hundred" courts--which were formally under the jurisdiction of royal sheriffs. 
The hallmark of these communities was the co-existence of their relative legal and 
social freedom and the constant threat of manorial encroachment to which they 
were subjected. Their primary system of defense was the strict system of 
horizontal rights and obligations which was expressed in their inheritance 
practices and family relationships, as well as through their courts and councils and 
juries. 'These cultural-practices will-serve .them .well in their -relative capacity .to 
appropriate universal rights into local benefits. 
The third sphere was the towns and municipalities of the urban boroughs. 
These constituted a kind of hybrid. On the one hand boroughs were usually 
located in land controlled by manorial lords. In this setting urban tenants had the 
same obligations to the lord as did the servile peasant labour. They were 
answerable to the lords in the manor court and forced to labour regularly on their 
lands. At same time their mercantile activities required a considerable degree of 
co-ordination among themselves, and to this end numerous self-governing 
institutions outside the manor courts had developed over time. ' The first of these 
was the merchant guild. Its members looked with envy at the rights of vassals, 
noting that the autonomy endowed by these rights were directly contingent on 
their relationship with their lords. 
Finally, the fourth sphere was that of the monarchy. The post-Conquest 
English monarchy was, in comparative terms with the rest of Europe, extremely 
centralized and bureaucratized. Its capacity for administration now legendary 
through the Domesday records. Nonetheless the crown was hemmed in ultimately 
by its relentless and urgent need for the wages of war on the one hand, and the 
power of manorial lords and urban merchants to resist providing the financial 
support for monarchical military ambitions. Crown and baronial antagonism 
reflected royal frustration over not being able to gain access to the resources 
necessary for foreign wars--especially against the French--as well as the difficulty 
in controlling the violence of the warring countryside, the political demands of 
rebelling barons. The crown was especially annoyed that even merchants were 
beyond its reach; indeed there was good reason to believe that the political 
loyalties, not to mention the wealth, of great merchants would follow the lead of 
the barons' revolts. 
The crown, the towns, and the pastoral communities had nothing in 
common except an overwhelming mutual antagonism to the manorial spheres of 
private power. Urban antagonism reflected the demands of urban dwellers for the 
same degree of autonomy as manorial vassals. In this desire for municipal 
juridical independence, merchants and artisans were united. Merchants, 
moreover, were indeed inspired by baronial revolts; if their wealth was in so much 
demand they saw no reason why they should not expect in return a share in wider 
political power. Finally, pastoral peasant antagonism reflected the constant 
attempts on the part of manorial lords to "manorialize" their free-holding farms, 
rob them of their free legal status, and ultimately to be subjected to the condition 
of rightlessness characteristic of those peasants answerable only to the "will of the 
lord" in the manor court. 
How did the English state overcome these separate spheres and create a 
single entity? Most crudely put, over many years and many conflicts a political 
"alliance" develops between "the people" and the "law."17 This alliance takes the 
institutional shape of a triadic configuration of linkages among the crown, urban 
dwellers, and pastoral peasant communities. This configuration must be visualized 
as a geometric matrix of networks and linkages in continual relational tension and 
movement among and between the different connecting nodes. 
Deploying Norman administrative structures, centralizing principles of 
Roman Law, ancient juridical customs of the realm, Canon Law and a host of 
other free-floating resources, the monarchy carried out a legal revolution in the 
twelfth through fourteenth centuries. What was revolutionary was both the fact 
of "precocious" territorial-wide unification and the method of accomplishing it: It 
was crafted by the crown forging structural links with the pastoral and urban 
communities. At the same time, through a widely expanded elaboration of royal 
legal rules and regulations, it formally encircled all the communities of the realm 
by creating powerful territorial-wide public institutions which functioned over and 
above private feudal power. The result was an early territorial-wide nation-state 
which incorporated the localities into a single entity but without dismantling the 
smaller ones. Rather than setting up an alternative state apparatus parallel to its 
competitors the state was created by the crown's incorporation of all these pre- 
existing legal and governing bodies into a single entity. I t  can be pictured as a 
transformation from numerous entities, to the encirclement but not the 
fundamental disruption of them, by a surrounding set of public institutions. These 
formed the heart of the public sphere--an institutional matrix of complex 
connections. 
I have of course presented hypostatized and abstract picture of a dramatic 
historical process driven by momentous conflicts and power relations. This is not 
the place, however, to spell out in a large canvas that drama of struggle and state- 
building and the making of the public sphere. Suffice it to say here that this is the 
institutional foundation of the English nation-state. I t  is this configurational 
institution to which members of previously separate communities first come to 
belong as national members. And it is this public sphere which first confers 
national citizenship rights on its members. 
Earlv English Citizenship-and--a Political Culture of Rights 
The nature of English citizenship was a direct outcome of the method and 
consequences of the mode of formation of the institutional body in which a 
territorial-wide political culture of rights first develops. As I described above, that 
entity of which the population became members was constructed in part through 
the conjoining and appropriation from below of local political institutions and 
practices. These were in turn codified above through centralized institutions and 
then in turn reapplied to the communities through local administrators who were 
nonetheless ultimately accountable to the national state. 
The first national body to confer citizenship was thus constructed on the 
conjoining and interdependence of local communities, institutions, practices, and 
doctrines with a central organizing body. This was a public realm built on 
mandatory ~ommunitv inclusion, and participatorv law and governance-and it is 
this that is above all significant in the formation of a political culture of rights and 
the practical meaning that citizenship actually takes. The consequence of this 
historical process was the creation of a hvbrid political culture which was both new 
and old, national and local, and which embodied all the principles and power 
relations of the different local cultural spheres. 
What was new was membership in a national body to which people were 
both answerable and as well as endowed with rights. These rights were only 
meaningful in the context of their linkage to membership in the national sphere 
and access to its legal system over and above that of private power. What was 
old, however, was just as important. The linkages were not between the crown 
and individuals, but between public national institutions and local community 
ones--local juries, the constabulary, local assizes, and so on. The benefits of 
national membership were utterly contingent upon membership in these local 
institutions, making individuals and families also answerable and responsive to 
local and practices and sanctions, to the old duties and rights attached to local 
membership. 
As a mutually constituted realm, neither the national nor the local had 
power without the other. Alone, local communities could not protect themselves 
from manorial power and eventually market exploitation; while the crown in turn 
wholly depended on this newly expanded power base. Borrowing a term from a 
scholar of urban life, this hybrid-like configuration was comprised of "worlds 
within worlds", or what I will call "membership within membership."l8 "Self- 
governance a t  the king's command" was the paradoxical contemporary expression 
of this political culture constructed on relational tensions and mutual 
interdependencies among groups and institutions. The resulting political culture 
was also a hybrid embodying all of these principles. And the three dimensions of 
citizenship that emerged were direct outgrowths of this hybrid political culture 
created of worlds within worlds. 
Civil Citizenship The first (although not necessarily chronologically) was 
the right and the obligation to public justice--the origins of civil citizenship. The 
spread, accessibility, and above all the discourse of public law virtually saturated 
English political culture. Its very essence was its promise to remedv the wrongs of 
the high and mighty power of feudal lords--a remedy of right that could counter 
through law the unequal position of rightlessness of the weak when confronted 
with the local power of private justice. Its hallmark was universality. As a 
discourse and an expectation, it was a resource for mobilization and a constant 
ideal and goal of those struggles. The fact of the frequency of struggles for its 
realization underlines just how uneven was its application in practice. 
Remarkably, and most notably, the ideal and the resource lived on despite 
evidence to the contrary. 
Based not on enacted laws or policies but on the principle of law as a set of 
public rules to resolve conflict and ensure equal protection to all, principles of civil 
right established the basis of liberty to be 'freedom from...', that is, freedom from 
the overbearing power of private feudal power by the protection of the public law. 
Linked in the seventeenth century to the theory of natural rights and property 
rights in labour and the individual, procedural civil justice gave rise to the 
animating myths of the 'free-born Englishman' and England's much touted 'rule of 
law' as it made universality before the law and the right to rebel against a 
tyrannical monarch (allegedly called into existence solely to protect the individual's 
rights) central to its organizing principles. Yet in their origins, these principles of 
right and property were not connected to the formulation of property as individual 
ownership in the juridical language of civil law and Locke, but to property as 
political membership--the contrast being between rights invested in things and 
rights invested in political relationships.19 The king's writ, for example, did not 
determine in advance how property disputes should be resolved, but rather ordered 
the dispute to be moved into the public courts thus giving people the right to 
public justice, not the determination of the nature of that justice. Once in the 
royal courts, however, i t  was the Assize of Clarendon which determined the 
procedure. Enacted enacted by the crown in the twelfth century, the Assize 
worked in-such a way that membership rather than property 'ownership' 
determined political and legal rights. By declaring that freeholders were not 
longer subject to absolute political power by private lords in disputes over their 
land, even if a person did not 'own' the .land, if the community supported his rights 
to it, he was now given the right to public justice in the kings courts. Because 
they came from a freeholding heritage, for rural-industrial families in particular, 
issues of economic survival were matters of public membership. 
One of the more interesting twists on civil citizenship is in the legal 
practices of eauitv. When in the fourteenth century the Chancery first began to 
take up the business of justice it offered itself as an alternative means of receiving 
justice from the lengthy and expensive procedures of the common law courts. In 
the Chancery no pleading was necessary by lawyers, no jury had to be convened-- 
'although expert witnesses were to be brought; and the initiation of the proceeding 
was a result of a petition from below. The key to this new swifter form of justice 
by which the 'less mighty' could be protected against the 'overmighty' was that by 
reaching directly to the king's courts, equity bypassed powerful county influence. 
As a procedure, equity was so popular that the conciliar courts were inundated 
with petitions for its use and it became the basis of procedure and judgment in the 
Privy Council, the Star Chamber, and the Court of Requests.20.. 
The substance of equity, however, was broader than mere procedural 
simplicity. In essence it was a concept of justice in which particular 
circumstances, considerations of hardship and mercy, and the putatively high- 
minded conscience of the king--rather than abstract principle--were factored into 
the passing of judgments. St. Germain was the most notable sixteenth century 
theorist of equity: 
Equity is righteousness that considers all the particular circumstances 
of the deed, which is also tempered with the sweetness of mercy ... And 
the wise man says: be not overmuch righteous, for the extreme 
righteousness is extreme wrong ... And therefore to follow the words of 
the law were in some case both against justice and the 
commonwealth: wherefore in some cases it is good and even necessary 
to leave words of the law and to follow that reason and justice 
require. And to that intent equity is ordained.21 
Equity appealed to the poor because it was an operational principle that 
focused on the relationship between needs and justice. It was meant to be a law 
that was appropriate and adaptable to changing circumstances. As such it directly 
competed with common law procedures which were so strictly tied to the letter of 
the law that the spirit of necessity was lost. As St. Germain stated about the 
purpose of the Court of Chancery: 
... And the Court of the Chancery is called of the common people the 
court of conscience, because the chancellor is not strained by rigour or 
form of words of law to judge but ex aeam and b o n ~  according to 
conscience. 22 
Rather than the law in its pristine logic, equity ruled as just the principles 
of 'natural justice, common sense, and common fairness7--principles that were 
applied by the state's conciliar courts to the task of redressing injustices inflicted 
on the poor by the unequal power of the 'overmighty.' The discretionary 
conscience of the king was to be the basis of such redress; and as long as such 
conscience was frequently mobilized, the centralized power of the crown could 
increase. By meeting the needs of those who felt lack of justice a t  the hands of the 
rigidities of common law procedures, and by providing redress where other forums 
of law had failed to adapt to changing circumstances23, the courts of equity forged 
direct links between the people and the institutions of the state while 
simuJtaneously carrying on the process of monarchical centralization through the 
law. 
If the king's conscience came to be a boon to the poor, the king's body--that 
is, his actual corporeal person--was of less importance. In English legal practice 
there was an English version of the Roman doctrine of the 'king's two bodies.'24 
The doctrine specified that every person in the realm including the king was 
subject to the law--even if the king was himself the maker of laws. The king in his 
person, for all the pomp attached to his physical being, was unquestionably 
subservient to the law even as the kingship-his office--was above it. The crown 
appropriated the principle of the invincibility of gffice to support the entrenchment 
of centralized administrative techniques and the power of the conciliar courts. By 
doing so, English monarchs created the conditions for the expectations of moral 
ily attaching an enduring obligation and justice from the crown without necessar 
allegiance to the particular person of the king himself. 
A remarkable mythology of the rule of law was the consequence of the 
Anglicanization of the doctrine of the king's duality. From oppressive legal 
proceedings to the most heinous impositions of tyranny by the state, not the failing 
of the law itself was blamed but rather corrupt individuals, ministers, particular 
events, and even kings who were abusing the rule of law. Only the English were 
so obsessed by the conviction of universality of law, that they claimed it was 
within the bounds of law to commit revolution and detach a king's head. Milton is 
attributed .with fits of 'legal antinomianism' in his cries for the utter legality- of 
regicide.25 The king's two Bodies was essential doctrine for both parliamentarians 
and the conservative agents of the restoration.26 
Nothing more slackens the reins of government, and the stability of 
peace, which is upheld by the reverent awe and respect which the 
people and subjects give to the Magistrate, than when by injustice 
and unworthiness, they bring their persons and authority under 
contempt and dislike; but that they seem not as Gods but Idols, which 
have eares but heare not, eyes but see not, mouths but speak not true 
yldpement. Against such Magistrates, people are prone to think it. 
not onlv just. but meritorious to rebel. 
John Ganden, "A Sermon Preached Before the Judges a t  
Chemeford"27 
The doctrine was also a t  the heart of the law's promise of universality. 
That the king in his person, for all the pomp attached to his physical being, was 
unquestionably subservient to the law created the conditions for popular 
expectations of moral obligation and justice from the royal law without attaching 
an enduring allegiance to the particular person of any one monarch. Universality 
was at the very core of English common law; king and pauper alike were equally 
subject to the law. There was no ambiguity about this; the term magistrate was 
applied equally to local political authorities, the power, duties, and accountability 
of Westminster were analogous to those of local authorities, and expectations of 
both were one and the same.28 If no authority was above the law, it followed 
naturally that if any acted as if they were, they were subject to legal removal by 
the injured parties. What was the definition of a governor and legislator? Even a 
Newcastle Whig answered in 1774 by declaring them as but 'trustees to the public' 
such that any such magistrates who abuse the laws by making 'laws more 
favourable to themselves than to him [the public]', or if they 'execute the laws 
more favourable to one than to another, or stretch them to an oppressive purpose 
to serve their own ends--they should be displaced, from the prince to the parish 
9 The dissociation of the rule of law from 
the rulers of law gave eminent rationality to an expectation of justice. 
Political Citizenship The second aspect of the political culture of rights, and 
the oldest of all, was compulsory participation in local governance, administration, 
and law--the origins of political citizenship. As I described above the public sphere 
integrated into participatory roles local courts and communities and the crown 
drew new lines of loyalty throughout the territory. I t  would be easy to dismiss 
any democratic outcomes in this structure of participation. But for two reasons 
this would be a mistake. First, English governance was chanelled through its 
legal system. The local courts served as political arenas and institutions. 
Secondly, it was precisely in legal institutions that community participation was 
not limited to county elites but spread deeply intokhe communities.30 The vastly 
smaller number of English salaried officials in contrast to the Continental system 
was made up by the heavy use of laymen.31 Joseph Strayer points out that by 
the thirteenth century England's royal government was involving almost the 
entire free population of the country in the work of the law courts ...' 32 These 
popular institutions included juries, bodies of 'expert witnesses' drawn from the 
communities requisite to almost all legal and administrative procedures, petitions, 
proclamations from the central government, village courts, the method of 
appointment of the constable, and to a limited extent, the electoral rights held in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by a surprisingly large number of small 
artisans and free-holders. 33 
Political citizenship was thus built upon an unpredictable contingency: The 
power of the centralized machinery--despite its coercive mechanisms, its 
prerogative courts, its county agents, its threatening letters, and its allures of 
patronage--had always to compete with that which had the potential to be an 
equally powerful influence on the action of local administrators--the W h b o r s .  
This counter-pressure, moreover, was grounded in and expressed through more 
than customary practices or social pressures. Popular participation in local and 
national governance was institutionally incorporated into the heart of the English 
bureaucratic apparatus.34 
A number of paradoxical outcomes developed from this. As a system of 
state-centered participatory rule--or self-governance at the king's command--the 
structure of rule could be neither fully state controlled nor fully decentralized. The 
result was a system of reciprocal enhancement of power between the center and 
the local branches of the state as the strength of each depended upon and in turn 
fostered the strength of the other. This in turn produced a politicized and 
negotiable chain of command in the English structure of rule; it was forced to  
operate through a contingent balance of coercion, negotiation, and multiple points 
of bargaining among each of the bodies in its chain of command. The state could 
not rule unconditionally but rather was forced to bargain with, exhort, and be 
vulnerable to local politics and popular communities. 'Ruling', observes 
seventeenth century historian Cynthia Herrup, 'was a repeated exercise in 
compromise, co-operation, co-optation and resistance.'35 As a consequence of 
participatory rights and duties, there was no a priori monopoly of power and the 
actual implementation of rights hinged on negotiation and political bargaining. 
Social Citizenship: The third aspect of citizenship was the regulation of 
economic life--the origins of Marshall's social citizenship. For my purposes, the 
most important was the body of industrial and welfare policies devoted not to 
eliminating but to regulating markets--from labour to grain. With the 1349 and 
1351 Ordinance and Statute of Labourers, a body of national laws regulating 
labour relations was first introduced to cover the entire realm. These were 
continually reintroduced and adjusted through the famous 1563 Elizabethan 
Statute of ~ r t i k e r s  regulating wages and apprenticeship practices, through the 
neglected 1604 statute instituting minimum wage regulations in the rural- 
industrial regions, until their final repeal in 1813 and 1814.36 Even more well 
known, of course, are the Poor Laws--versions of which date to the late thirteenth 
century--which included "unemployment benefits" and the recognition of structural 
unemployment. Many other welfare policies could be included, from the assizes of 
bread to regulation of working hours. 
But why should these laws--usually described as modes of social control and 
class power--fall under my category of citizenship rights? To understand that, it 
must be noted that the most significant feature of English welfare and industrial 
policies was that they were implemented through the normal channels and 
processes of government and law. The public courts doubled as labour tribunals; 
local justices and constables served as the administrative personnel; and juries, 
petitions, legal arbitrations, national courts were all part of the administrative 
labour process. 37 The consequences were tremendous: Labour relations operated 
within the structure of public law, and struggles over labour relations were 
converted into contestations between employers, workers, and political authorities 
over whether these laws would be tyrannies or rights. 
In the context of political citizenship this in turn had momentous 
consequences: .labour relations were negotiated through a legal system that was 
built upon multiple points of participatory access. By forging a direct link into the 
villages through JPs, constables, juries, and village courts, and by delegating to 
local authorities the task of administering labour regulations, the crown had in one 
swoop made vulnerable to local power all the essential aspects of labour relations-- 
labour supply, labour costs, and the cost of provisioning. Politics, not markets, 
would determine labour relations. Neither municipal guild regulations, nor 
magnate or gentry landlords, nor merchant capitalist employers would have a 
legal claim to an unmediated administrative or economic relationship to labour as 
the public sphere subjected all forms of the private labour contract (whether the 
private party was commercial landlords or merchant capital), agricultural and 
industrial labour alike, to  public legal jurisdiction. That all forms of the labour 
contract were now subject to public participatory legal mediation arguably had 
more impact on the abolition of feudal villeinage (serfdom) and the continued 
assertion of the right to freedom from private manorial and/or merchant capitalist 
power than did the 'transition from feudalism to capitalism' or other forms of class 
power and demographic change. 
What were the consequences of the politicizing of the labour contract within 
a public structure of rule whose chief features were its malleability, indeterminacy, 
and participatory accessibility? Because the English state was built on a 
participatory basis, exactly how labour relations were resolved in practice 
depended upon the nature of the different communities in which the law was 
actually exercised. ingl n n pr cti 
intenselv local legal and political cultures. The structure of rule in general and the 
character of labour relations in particular took different shape depending upon 
who had the power to participate. In the championlagrarian regions, the power to 
participate was eventually monopolized by large landholding gentry who used the 
civic liberty of the public law to free themselves from private magnates and assert 
themselves through the new found power of public judicial institutions. Labouring 
communities in these regions with little or no autonomous power were unable to 
take advantage of public participatory rights, and despite the legal freedom 
granted by public law, were subordinated through the legal process anew. In 
pastorallrural-industrial regions, by contrast, the absence of powerful social and 
political elites, the longer history of legal freedom, and the presence of strong 
popular communities meant that civic liberties and public participatory law 
promoted more favourable outcomes to the labouring communities. As active 
participants in the processes of governance, labouring communities were able to 
prevent private sources of power--both gentry and merchant- capitalists---from 
exploiting to complete advantage the public institutions of law while they were 
simultaneously able to demand and appropriate the law to strengthen their own 
independence. 
The local contextualizing of legal processes thus generated different patterns 
of justice and rights in different types of English communities.38 There were 
historically .persistent patterns of difference i n  the. structure of early labour 
markets, in the degree of popular participation in political and legal institutions, in 
the character of corporate village institutions, and in conceptions of justice and 
rights. Neither class nor status divisions cannot account for these differences since 
those in similar class situations maintained different degrees of power across 
communities. Instead, these cultural patterns were part of the interaction 
between England's participatory legal institutions on the one hand, and the 
presence of contrasting community patterns on the other. Popular empowerment 
varied in the degree to which communities were able to appropriate the law into a 
'judicial citizenship.' 
The significance of the political contingency, plasticity, and multiple points 
of participatory access in the structure of the public sphere was that it made the 
institutions of citizenship not the a priori domain of any one class or group but 
rather a 'multiple-use' structure--potentially available to be appropriated by those 
who had the capacity to appropriate public institutions. No one person, authority, 
institution, or class was simply free to impose and realize their interests but was 
rather forced to negotiate and bargain within this participatory public sphere. The 
fluency of the law and the administrative chain of command, the centrality of 
popular institutions and local governmental offices converged to made it possible 
under different conditions for different parties to grab hold of legal mechanisms 
and turn them to their own advantage. A culture of localism and 
participatory practices made the meaning of citizenship highly contested and 
variable depending on distribution of power to exercise rights. 
I will now take a deeper look a t  one of those political cultures within the 
public sphere: the medieval municipalities and their guild cultures. 
IV 
The Political Culture of the Towns and Guilds: the Relationality of Rights 
Images of medieval cities and guilds are more constructed and exploited in 
theories than analyzed in their historical practices. My effort here will be to 
ignore the "ideology of normative past" that infuses the historiography and social 
theory of urban life and to instead focus on what has been neglected--a focus on 
the forms of urban life and analysis of the intersection of cultural and institutional 
life.39 One reason for doing this is that medieval urban life provides an 
exemplary pattern of a political culture of citizenship rights both in formation and 
in action. I t  illustrates how struggles among communities and between spheres of 
power transformed into varieties of institutional relationships--relationships 
marked by ongoing tensions. These dynamic patterns become embodied and 
expressed within a political culture and are themselves sources of historical 
change. 
A second reason for looking closer a t  the medieval towns concerns their 
special impact on the development of England's public sphere. principles' of 
substantive justice and mercantilist policies for regulating economic life were 
'common to all European state-building strategies. But the manner in which 
England established territorial-wide political control over economic life was unique- 
-both in its relationship to the urban policies and in its impact on the national 
political culture. By the fourteenth century English cities and towns can be 
characterized by what I am calling "autonomy in membership" or "liberty in 
embeddedness." This meant that their legal self-governance and characteristically 
medieval economic autarky was wholly contingent on institutional ties of political 
reciprocity with the crown and the public sphere at  large. In its struggles for 
expanded national wealth (again, for the wages of war), the English crown was 
able to take advantage of this less than absolute autonomy of their medieval cities. 
On the Continent early absolutist regimes were unable to counter the complete 
autonomy of the urban burghers and guilds and thus had to "invent" anew their 
regulative institutions. Only in England was the crown able to appropriate from 
below and extend throughout the land the political and legal conventions of the 
medieval cities. From the mid-fourteenth century through the seventeenth- 
century Stuart regime English monarchs and state builders engaged in a steady 
process of "breaking open" the insulated town policies and instituting throughout 
the country a t  large the same vast system of regulative and redistributive laws 
which had previously been limited to urban, guild and even canon law. 
Continental monarchs by contrast, were left with only national regulative control 
over commodity markets and foreign trade. 
These statutes and conventions were a key feature in shaping the 
development of the English political culture of citizenship --especially in the crucial 
realm of social rights. In contrast to continental Europe where the culture of the 
guilds was restricted to urban settings, England's public sphere blended the 
political and legal cultures of town and country labour.40 Since urban culture and 
law was thus so central to the public sphere as a whole we-must look closer,at it to 
understand the foundations of the national political culture. 
Libertv in Embeddedness: the City and the crown . 
In popular lore, medieval cities are most renowned for having been a refuge 
for personal liberty in an age of arbitrary feudal power and insecurity.41 -'A year 
and a day' was the customary amount of 'city-air' an escaped villein needed to 
gain freedom. But this was not the kind of freedom Pirenne and others identified 
as the origins of capitalist individualism.42 Indeed Pirenne and Weber and even 
Marx to a degree all believed the motor of modern capitalist growth--whether 
conceived in Pirenne's terms as free market individualism, or Weber's as the site 
of rational domination and legitimacy--was in the mercantile activities of the 
medieval cities. Pirenne in particular has been hugely influential in locating in the 
towns the origins of cultural individualism. But capitalist breakthroughs did not 
originate primarily from the cities; nor was the secret to its success unregulated 
mercantile activity. Our interest in the freedoms of the city must take us to a 
rival and relatively unrecognized concept of liberty--both economic and personal.43 
The "liberty" of the towns had both a corporate and a personal meaning. 
But it was from the corporate that individual liberty derived.44 The hallmark of 
the English--and London is of course the most outstanding case--was its liberty in 
membership and its autonomy in embededness. In marked contrast to the Italian 
communes (e.g. the Lombards) which gained total independence from any wider 
sphere, the very triumph of the English urban commune and its strength of self- 
governance was contingent on its embeddedness within the political framework of 
the realm.45 This wider national power was in turn sustained by what was also 
unusual in comparative terms--the inclusion, rather than the locking out, of urban 
groups in the wider political sphere. How did this autonomy in embeddedness 
develop? 
The story of the political culture of urban rights begins with the initial 
subordination of towns to fiefdoms or royal desmenses I described above. The 
struggle for municipal independence takes shape in the twelfth century. Through 
a curious (but surprisingly common) discursive twist urban dwellers found a 
cultural and institutional resource in the language of rights in play between feudal 
lords and their vassals.46 This was a language which invested rights in the 
inviolability of relationships, responsibilities, and above all membership. This 
discourse, however, could not be inexorably attached to the social foundations of 
vassallage; with political effort merchants and artisans appropriated and 
transformed the specificity of these rights tota potentially similar relationship 
between themselves and the crown. 
The language of rights in reciprocity was a considerable cultural resource for 
a political struggle. In late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries the English 
crown was in desperate need for merchant wealth, and had numerous occasions to 
feel the threatening implications of merchants in alliance with baronial political 
rebellions. With such potentially mutual benefits the alliance of town and crown is 
not surprising. English towns began the process of wresting juridical and political 
power from feudal magnates through winning grants of self-governance from the 
crown. These charters of liberties as they were called endowed local autonomy 
under ultimate Royal law. In return they paid royal taxes and bought royal 
farms. The first great victory was the establishment in 1191 of the London 
commune--"subject to the king's pleasure. "47 Londoners founded their commune 
on a sworn association of citizens with its own juridical personality which existed 
within a reciprocal relationality with the crown. 
This triumph of quasi-autonomy was nonetheless precarious; continual 
struggles to maintain juridical and legal independence, now with the crown, 
characterized the whole thirteenth century. But by the fourteenth century, 
autonomy in membership developed to the point where not only were merchants 
included in Parliament, an extremely unusual development in comparative terms, 
but artisan powers and juridical autonomy were locally and nationally enlarged 
and buttressed. The strength of the reciprocity is revealed in the granting of 
liberties by the English crown. French territorial lords nor urban burghers did not 
need monarchical grants; they simply took their power. Instead of consolidating 
tensions within a single public sphere, the French monarchy was forced for 
centuries to co-exist in direct competition with these separate spheres of power. 
Corporate membership in the national public sphere was thus -the 
prerequisite for urban liberties. Communal independence was achieved not 
through city-state status, but by  reshifting institutional alignments from those of 
subordination within private spheres of manorial power, to those of partial 
autonomy within the sphere of public power. The rights that were gained were 
the rights of citizens--to rule and be ruled. The cultural and institutional 
foundations of Marshall's civil, political and social citizenship rights took shape 
within this pattern of autonomy in membership. 
Guild, Citizenship and the Public Sphere 
Our story must move from the "macro" relationship of town and crown, to 
the "micro" level of individual and guild. The process of individual freedom, 
however, followed a similar course to that of communal. Just as communal liberty 
developed through institutional and membership realignments, so the freedoms 
and the rights of the urban individual were also contingent upon membership-- 
both locally and within the multiple ties and relationships of the larger public 
sphere. 
The inequalities of the medieval towns were as vast as anything we know 
today. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries artisanal labour was proliferating. 
In the early days of municipal independence artisans of lesser wealth, primarily 
crafts people, found themselves defenseless against the new town authorities (often 
comprised of urban dynasties) who were not interested in giving the commoners 
the same powers as themselves. The mode by which artisanal rights were gained 
within the town parallels the struggle of the commune as a whole within the 
fiefdom: Total autonomy was traded for partial autonomy through the formation of 
crafts guilds based on strict rules and regulations of membership.48 Before 
exploring the culture of guild membership it is important first to understand its 
struggle for existence. 
Economic regulation is the first thing we associate with the power of 
guilds.49 But alone economic regulations were weak. The challenge and the 
necessity if guilds were indeed to provide a base for artisanal freedom was for 
them to become legally constituted bodies, not just informal solidaristic groups. 
Just as only through membership would an individual gain her own power of 
autonomy and freedom from greater power, only through constitutional inclusion 
would artisans as a group gain the power of autonomy and self-governance. This 
didn't come easily. 
The essential step by which individuals found their own local freedom in 
membership in strictly regulated guilds occurs by a direct "alliance" between guild 
and crown. In a process of struggle lasting almost half a century, guilds battle 
local elites of merchants and authorities to win not only official recognition by, but 
notable power within, both local and national governance. The triumph occurs in 
1319 by Royal Charter under King Edward 11. Article 7 was crucial: all 
"inhabitants to be admitted [into the freedom] shall be of some mistery ...I1; anyone 
seeking to obtain the freedom who did not belong to a guild "shall then only be 
admitted with full .assent of the-commonality~assembled. "50 In translation that 
meant that to become a citizen one had to enter into or "possess" the "freedom" of 
the town or city. Yet entry to the freedom and thus to citizenship could onlv be 
achieved th rou~h  membership in a -mild (a "mistery"). 
This remarkable feat was institutionalized in the 1319 charter which 
became popularly known as the Magna Carta of the London commonality. It 
represented, according to G.A. Williams, the "highest peak of achievement that a 
popular movement ever attained in medieval London. "5 1 That achievement 
forged a mighty bond between guild membership and citizenship--a bond 
accomplished through what Rappaport calls "a collaboration of crown, city and 
companies."52 Although not created by the crown, guilds were nonetheless 
required to be registered with the state, which in turn endowed charters of local 
self-governance. The charters confirmed the ancient privileges of citizenship and 
during the two centuries after Edward I1 granted his famous charter, over one 
hundred London guilds were incorporated as livery companies, each with similar 
provisions and ordinances. 
Despite the considerable restrictions and obligations of guild membership by 
the sixteenth-century the overwhelming majority Londoners elected to assume 
them to gain rights of the freedom. From 1531 through the 1550's the average 
number of artisans admitted each year into 12 companies (215's of all men 
admitted in 1551-3) rose by 69%. This was more than three times the increase in 
the city's population; by the mid-sixteenth century, approximately three quarters 
of London's men were free. Remarkably nine-tenths of all London citizens had 
entered the freedom through obtaining apprenticeship and guild membership.53. 
One half of all men were citizens in Norwich and York, while in Coventry 4 out of 
5 male householders were free by the early sixteenth century.54 Part of the 
explanation for this may have been that 'forreners' were not expelled from the 
towns but co-opted into the regulations of membership. London apprenticeship 
fees, moreover, were significantly reduced in the Acts of 1531 and 1536. 
Nonetheless that charters combined the right to self-rule and the guarantee that 
citizenship alone endowed the right to practice one's craft was certainly the 
overwhelming reason. 
State-building and local membership were mutual partners in the 
enlargement of citizenship rights. That guild law was strong to the extent it was 
structurally allied with the muscle of public law can be underlined with an 
example of failed autonomy. Assguilds became more hierarchicalized in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the journeymen engaged in numerous attempts 
to establish journeymen's and yeoman's guild that were autonomous from their 
masters. This act of counter-sovereignty was a threat to the crown and to 
parliament of an entirely different order. Through the establishment of what was 
to be a long chain of "anti-combination" laws, journeymen's guilds were legally 
forbidden. Outside of membership in the public sphere, the freedom they sought 
had no chance of survival. 
il 
But what exactly did it mean to be in a guild? The answer to that question 
lies in the institution of apprenticeship.55 The strictest guild regulation was that 
more was required for a skilled artisan to ply the trade than mere knowledge of a 
craft. To practice the "arte and mistery" of a craft required membership. Only 
members of a guild could legally practice their craft in a town, but only an 
apprenticeship earned guild membership. Seven years was the standard 
apprenticeship-time required to acquire the adequate skills and hence the right of 
entry to a guild. At the end of the service, the crafts-person (now a journeyman) 
was taken through a public ceremony in which he or she swore by oath to follow 
the guild's rules and obligations.56 With that oath the artisan was entitled to the 
mutual benefits of membership which included guaranteed citizenship, livelihood, 
employment, mutual aid, religious life, social organizations-indeed an entire cradle 
to grave culture. 
But the meaning of an apprenticeship was not primarily one of a temporary 
period of training. Paradoxically, it was not "over" at the end of seven years. 
Like an academic credential the apprenticeship now became the artisan's 
permanent property--germanent as long as practiced within the regulative confines 
of the guild. This last point is the essential one. Even though the property of 
apprenticeship reflected the journeyman's specific skill and investment of time, 
this was not mobile property that attached to the individual crafts person.57 Far 
more significantly the achievement of a successful apprenticeship was the 
achievement of a guaranteed place in a deep culture of attachments--along with all 
the rights and obligations consequent to those attachments. 
The property of skill acquired during an apprenticeship was in fact a social 
membership. The medieval word for skill is 'mistery' (as in the 'art and mistery 
of weaving') indicating that knowledge of a craft was viewed as a specialized 
secret.58 Used in this way, skill could be seen as an individual attribute--a form 
of 'human capital'--that no one could take away from the owner. But mistery had 
another meaning and use-that ,prevailed over the first--it .was, also- the medieval 
word for the craft guild itself, the social body, the fellowship, the corporate and 
instituted group.59 Unlike the word skill which is singular and individual, mistery 
was simultaneously individual and corporate. To possess the mistery was to 
simultaneously "possess" knowledge and membership. 
But for both aspects of the concept, skill was a social mistery, not a 
technical one. It was thus a form of cultural capital rather than human capital as 
we now understand it. An unskilled worker was not unskilled because he or she 
was untrained. Indeed, through a wide array of illegal practices many unskilled 
workers in fact were technically trained. The definition of unskilled was to be 
without an apprenticeship. And without an apprenticeship one was excluded from 
a mistery, beyond the bounds and the bonds of relationality, and thus excluded 
from the rights of membership. The attachments of membership, not training or 
ability alone, conferred legality and the property of skill. 60 
Citizenship Rights in Action 
The rubric of citizenship entailed civil, political, and social rights. The chief 
expression of civil liberty was in the guaranteed access to public law, the right to 
defend by law, the capacity to sue and to plead in court under an impartial judge, 
and the security against arbitrary violence that civil law promised. Citizens could 
only be prosecuted in the courts of the city for city offenses and no citizen could 
sue another or had to plead in civil courts outside the walls of the city.61 The 
promise of the universality of law--of course more recognized in the breach--served 
as a form of empowerment against numerous sources of the over mighty ('we 
cannot be equal with those more powerful'). 
At times by choice, a t  others by compulsion, political rights were the most 
active dimension of citizenship. The right and necessity to local self-rule mediated 
the relationship between crown and individual artisan. Only citizenship permitted 
political participation. Since membership in a guild was the.prerequisite for 
admission into the freedom, guilds effectively determined who exercised full 
political rights. (These included the right to participate in public ceremonial 
processions and "mistery plays" which afflrmed the political identity of 
membership. 62) 
Local governance was institutionalized through the courts. As a public 
lawmaking body, gudd leaders served public legal functions such as council 
member, alderman, jury members, and constables.63 Guilds, moreover, had their 
own courts. Both town ,and guild courts were institutions of governance and 
administration, as well as of formal juridical procedure. In addition, they served 
as forums for public discussion and resolution of the disputes of public life and 
labour (economic conflicts, unfair labour, etc.) Participation in the administration 
of law, and often with more power than municipal governments, made guilds what 
Rappaport calls the "courts of daily life."64 Local governance was permanently 
shaped by the political culture of the guild. 
The third set of rights to which all citizens were entitled came under the 
category of the right to social justice. Social justice, by law and by guild, was 
defined as the right to livelihood, to a fair wage, to available employment, to 
poverty benefits, mutual aid, burial rites, tramping privileges, and many more.65 
Possession of the freedom was again the prerequisite for these rights to justice, 
and by controlling entry to citizenship, the guild's corporate power of membership 
became the means to social justice. That rights were defined as monopoly and 
restriction seemed not a contradiction. As I've tried to show, this was a political 
culture which embedded freedom in regulation and membership; the regulation of 
livelihood was the job of the freedom.66 In the fourteenth century the 'ancient' 
right of citizenship was reconfirmed: Only citizens could sell in towns, and only 
freemen could legally practice their crafts. Justice, regulation, and the freedom 
coexisted in this unfamiliar political culture. 
The culture of the guild was thus constructed on attachment and 
membership. The body of rights and obligations stemmed from the strength and 
upkeep of those relationships. But guilds neither promised nor offered the a 
traditional world of gemeinschaft. The purpose of the property of membership was 
precisely to provide the foundations for artisanal independence and personal 
liberties.67 The prominent emphasis among artisans on independence and 
autonomy suggests the importance of distinguishing the moral from the 
institutional conception of rights. The right to the freedom of practicing one's skill, 
as well as that of citizenship, achieved the goal of individual empowerment. But 
this empowerment only had viability when rooted in the institutional foundations 
of attachments and membership. Only the possession of membership allowed for 
individual empowerment and the meaningful exercise of rights. 
The property of skill and relationality thus turned out to be the key to the 
city. A multiple matrix of linkages had been established: To become a citizen one 
had to enter into or possess the freedom. Yet entry to the freedom, and thus to 
citizenship, could only be achieved through the channel of guild membership and 
apprenticeship. Making the guild the source of public and private empowerment 
was. no mean accomplishment;-according to Wilwin it .gave the- crafts a major hold 
on the constitution and provided the basis for virtually all the political 
achievements that were to follow.68 
Creating a public sphere as in part the city writ-large did not automatically 
confer these citizenship rights on all people, or to the same effect. But among "the 
people" those included and excluded (including gender exclusion) were less based 
on class divisions or land ownership than on the political contingencies of 
membership--indeed on the possibilities of membership--in the different sorts of 
social communities in which English law actually operated. 
Conclusion 
Marshall's moral impulse and his focus on the exigency of what he called 
the "abatement" of inequality with social justice is needed now more than ever. 
But by conflating class and citizenship he makes it more difficult to make sense of 
the varying effects of the interaction between the two. Nonetheless, T.H. 
Marshall has set the terrain for all discussions of these issues for many decades to 
come. We can truly celebrate the reissue of his book. 
Let me end by reflecting on a few points for discussion. This essay has 
numerous obvious egregious omissions--dealing specifically with the issues of 
gender and citizenship is perhaps the most obvious in the context of English . 
history. Nor am I able to give full due to the revised conception of property I have 
suggested above. Rather than try to abate these errors in a conclusion I will 
highlight a few theoretical points. 
The first addresses the difficulty of decoupling the study of citizenship from 
its saturation in the intellectual legacy of classical modernization theory (and its 
concomitant class formation theory) by returning to medieval institutional 
foundations. A two-fisted criticism usually awaits attempts to do so. The first is 
the accusation of nostalgia; the second is the accusation of teleology. Both, I 
believe, suggest the power of that very same classical modernization theory to 
overdetermine what should be straightforward historical criticism. Both suggest 
that for social scientists, medieval history is little known but much appropriated 
for normative purposes of every persuasion. 
The concern that medieval scholarship is nostalgic rather than analytic 
clearly reflects two related problems. The first is the extraordinary degree to 
which the need to believe in the progressive nature of capitalism remains 
embedded in scholarship. The widespread worry of being accused of being a 
Romantic or, .worse yet, a guild socialist, reveals the deep similarities between 
liberal and Marxist social science. The second problem is the perserverence of a 
holistic conception of society. I t  is very hard to give up the idea that medieval life 
was not a feudal societv--a social science concept that depends on the notion of a 
singular societal core essence with co-variation among the social parts. But 
medieval guilds, for example, just as all of medieval life, had aspects both 
seemingly "traditional," and seemingly "modern." (Were its practices of 
solidaristic inclusion and exclusion through the property and possession of 
apprenticeship, for example, more or less modern or more or less traditional than, 
say, graduate training and the PhD?) To suggest that medieval life did not 
conform to images of "traditional society" or "feudal society" is not to suggest it 
was a gemeinschaft. It is, rather, a wholesale rejection that the notions of either a 
"traditional" or a "modern" society bear any resemblance to historically grounded 
concepts that can actually explain anything a t  all; this rejection is in turn an 
attempt to present an analysis of institutional relationships rather than societal 
types. 
The worry about teleology reflects one overwhelming issue: the 
perserverence of our belief in a Rubicon in history that took place a t  some time 
known as the "transition from feudalism to capitalism" or alternatively, as the 
industrial revolution. But to find institutional roots of modern life is not to 
suggest that things either M to turn out the way they did (which is the meaning 
of teleology) or that there were rn changes or not even tremendous changes. It is 
rather to argue that one looks for causal roots in order to identify the conditions 
for emergence and development. If that search takes me to the thirteenth 
century--so be it. Again, I believe that to be institutional analysis, not teleology. 
The philosopher of science, Ian Hacking, has recently named this historical 
approach the analysis of "words in their sites." 
Such long-term comparative research into the interaction between political 
culture and citizenship surely suggests the hubris and recklessness of the historical 
sociologist. To be sure; but it nonetheless also makes possible a decisive break 
with axiomatic connexions between societal transformation and political 
institutions. Citizenship cannot be viewed as a product of progressive 'stages' of 
socio-economic development or of the 'transition from feudalism to capitalism.' 
Indeed the analysis calls into question two of historical sociology's master concepts- 
-modernization and the primacy of socio-economic structures--highlighting instead 
the centrality of legal power, degrees of popular empowerment, and a contested 
culture of rights. 
Finally, I have- also.tried- to offer two friendlyr'amenilments to recent 
developments in social science. The first concerns the role of the state. The long- 
time neglect to the state in social analysis has finally been compensated for. Less 
attention, however, has been paid to the ways in which the development of legal 
power--both in principle and in structure--was a source of popular empowerment, a 
potential resource against both private power and the coercive aspects of the state 
itself--indeed a central aspect of identity-formation.69 Power under the English 
law was plural, porous, and contingently embedded in communities, rather than 
unitary, absolute, and wielded only from above. The plasticity of legal and 
economic power suggests why different patterns of rights-claims could develop in 
different communities. Shifting analysis away from the 'role of the state' to the 
character of the 'public sphere,' brings attention to the impact of competing 
private and public spheres of power over and above traditional class divisions. A 
malleable and contested legal power was a t  the center of England's political 
culture. 
My second amendment is to a common thread underlying recent 
historiographical and sociological moves to abandon the determinancy of economic 
relations and instead to concentrate principally on culture, discourse, and ideology. 
These revisions have been valuable. Paradoxically, however, they have often had 
the unintended consequence of reinforcing (by neglect) the 'economism' of social 
history. Stressing culture or even politics as separate spheres leaves intact the 
fiction that markets are self-regulating, autonomous systems; it locates 'labour' 
and property and material life on one side, and cultural and political concerns on 
the other. But economic life is too important to leave to the economists. 
The challenge to the 'economistic fallacy' must be two-fold: It must not only 
reject the idea that the state (or culture, or ideas) are driven by the logic of the 
economy. More fundamentally, it must challenge the idea that there exists a 
'logic' of the economy that is not itself politically and culturally constructed.70 I 
would go so far as to suggest that even the conceptual unity of something called 
'capitalism' might also be questioned. 7 1 Without both revisions, the special status 
of the economy is often reinforced by the use of such terms as 'extra-economic', 
'non-economic', or the 'relative autonomy of the state'--all of which underline the 
economy as the base-line of social processes.72 
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